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THE EFFECTS OF SMOKING LAWS ON SEATING
 
ALLOCATIONS OF RESTAURANTS, BARS, AND TAVERNS
 
JOHN DUNHAM and MICHAEL L. MARLOW* 
Supporters of smoking laws often argue that they do not harm restaurants, bars, 
and ta�erns and may e�en raise their proﬁts. Opponents argue that owners cater to 
customer preferences regarding smoking and that laws mandating speciﬁc smoking 
policies will therefore negati�ely impact proﬁts of some ﬁrms. This article tests 
hypotheses regarding how smoking laws affect seating allocations, using data from a 
nationwide sur�ey of restaurant and bar owners. The empirical e�idence indicates 
that smoking laws exert no signiﬁcant effect on seating allocations. Firms are shown 
to allocate greater shares of seating to nonsmoking use when customers exhibit 
stronger preferences for such seating. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Laws restricting smoking in restaurants 
have been enacted in 32 states. Supporters of 
these laws often argue that they do not harm 
ﬁrms and may even raise their proﬁts.1 Re­
cent studies, for instance, argue that outright 
bans on smoking in eating and drinking 
places have not adversely affected these es­
tablishments, suggesting that smoking bans 
either do not reduce demand or lower costs 
for ﬁrms, which offsets sales losses, thus 
leading to no adverse changes in proﬁts. 
Opponents of smoking restrictions argue that 
owners cater to customer preferences re­
*This article is based on an earlier study that was 
conducted for Philip Morris Management Corporation. 
The authors thank William J. Boyes, Frank J. Chaloupka, 
and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. 
Dunham: Manager of Fiscal Issues, Philip Morris Man­
agement Corporation, New York, New York, Phone 
917-663-2835,  Fax  917-663-5379,  E-mail  
john120@idt.net 
Marlow: Professor, Department of Economics, Califor­
nia Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, 
California, Phone 805-756-1764, Fax 805-756-1473, 
E-mail mmarlow@calpoly.edu 
1. Proponents of smoking bans also often argue 
that, absent such restrictions, taxpayers are forced to 
pick up part of the higher health care costs of smokers 
in Medicaid, Medicare and private insurance programs. 
However, Lee 1991a, 1991b suggests that smoking bans 
can not be expected to lower this type of externality. See 
also a recent Congressional Research Service report for 
Congress �Gravelle and Zimmerman 1994 ,� which ar­
gues that it is likely that passive smoke risk has been 
overestimated by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration. The July 1998 decision by U.S. District 
Judge William L. Osteen also concluded after ﬁve years 
of court proceedings that the EPA had wrongly labeled 
secondhand smoke a class A carcinogen and that the 
agency relied on faulty science to reach the conclusion 
it wanted. 
garding smoking. Some owners would ﬁnd it 
proﬁtable to allow smoking throughout their 
establishments, others to forbid all smoking, 
and still others to accommodate both smok­
ers and nonsmokers by investing in parti­
tions, designating areas, creating smoking 
patios or rooms, and�or investing in air ﬁl­
tration systems. They argue that laws that 
mandate speciﬁc smoking policies will there­
fore negatively impact proﬁts of some ﬁrms. 
Little economic research has been pub­
lished on the effects of smoking laws on 
revenues of restaurants, bars, and taverns, 
and none has been directed toward the issue 
of smoking�nonsmoking seating allocations.2 
This article provides a framework for exam­
ining how customer preferences inﬂuence 
smoking and nonsmoking seating allocations 
by owners�the primary policy that ﬁrms 
unilaterally adopt in their attempts to deal 
with the issue. Hypotheses regarding how 
smoking laws affect seating allocations are 
then tested using data from a nationwide 
survey of 1,300 restaurant, bar, and tavern 
owners. The empirical evidence indicates that 
smoking laws exert no signiﬁcant effect on 
seating allocations. 
II. ECONOMIC MODEL AND
 
TESTABLE HYPOTHESES
 
Without legal restrictions, policies adopted 
by restaurants, bars, and taverns toward 
2. See, for instance, M. K. Evans unpublished data , 
Glantz and Smith �1994, 1997 , and Sciacca and Ratliff 
�1998� for studies of the effects of smoking laws on 
revenues of restaurants. 
� � � � 
smoking are determined in much the same 
manner as decisions regarding menus, prices, 
and hours of operation. Proﬁt-maximizing 
ﬁrms optimize on the basis of customer de­
mand and costs. Decisions pertaining to 
smoking policies simply allocate the air space 
within ﬁrms between smoking and nonsmok­
ing customers.3 The air space within an es­
tablishment is considered just like any other 
resource, and owners decide to cater solely 
to smokers, to nonsmokers, or to both by 
providing patrons with rights to smoke while 
accommodating others through smoking� 
nonsmoking areas and air ﬁltration systems. 
The choice depends on customer preferences 
and relative marginal costs.4 Predictably, 
market segmentation naturally evolves where 
ﬁrms cater more to smokers in markets dom­
inated by smokers than in those markets 
dominated by nonsmokers. 
There may also be broad differences be­
tween how owners of restaurants and bars or 
taverns allocate seating. Customers of 
restaurants are likely to prefer that owners 
adopt different accommodation strategies 
than would patrons of bars and taverns. 
Restaurant customers tend to dine in one 
location within ﬁrms, and therefore it is pos­
sible for owners to designate sections for 
smokers and nonsmokers, and this pre­
dictably leads to a relatively high allocation 
of nonsmoking seating. In contrast, cus­
tomers of bars and taverns may prefer to 
participate in various activities Ždining, 
drinking, listening to music, dancing, and 
playing pool, darts, and billiards. whereby 
they move to different locations within the 
establishment during their visit and interact 
with different patrons. It is relatively more 
difﬁcult and therefore costly to designate 
areas for smokers and nonsmokers in bars 
and taverns, and this predictably leads to a 
relatively low allocation of nonsmoking seat­
ing. Moreover, because of the interactive 
atmosphere of bars and taverns, it is unlikely 
that all nonsmokers wish to remain sepa­
3. Lee �1991b� argues that owners of private estab­
lishments have an incentive to internalize externalities 
associated with smoking; see also Tollison and Wagner 
1992 and Boyes and Marlow 1996 . 
4. Smoking policies may also be inﬂuenced by pref­
erences of owners, managers, and employers, but it is 
unclear that their preferences would override those of 
customers when owners proﬁt maximize and hire in 
competitive labor markets. 
rated from their smoking friends Žand vice 
.versa , and therefore many bar and tavern 
owners may ﬁnd it relatively unproﬁtable 
Žand unpopular. to segregate these two 
groups. 
This reasoning leads to the testable hy­
pothesis that the mix of smoking�nonsmok­
ing seating is inﬂuenced by the smoking pref­
erences of customers so that nonsmoking 
seating allocations are inversely related to 
the percentage of customers who smoke. It is 
also possible that the smoking characteristics 
of state populations may be a signiﬁcant 
factor explaining whether state governments 
pass smoking restrictions. We expect that 
states with relatively few smokers are more 
likely to pass smoking laws. 
III. DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
Survey data collected by Roper Starch for 
the National Licensed Beverage Association 
is used to examine how smoking laws inﬂu­
ence seating allocations. The survey was con­
ducted by telephone interviews during the 
period of September 5�12, 1996. All inter­
viewing was conducted from the Roper 
Starch central interviewing facility. The sam­
ple consisted of owners�managers of 1,300 
randomly drawn restaurants Ž650. and bars 
or taverns Ž650. across the United States. 
Samples were drawn in a statistically random 
manner from national lists provided by Sur­
vey Sampling, Inc., a major supplier of survey 
samples to research organizations. To the 
extent that the Survey Sampling lists include 
most full-service restaurants and bars or tav­
erns in the United States, the survey results 
are applicable to all such establishments with 
a maximum sampling error of approximately 
plus or minus four percentage points for 
each sample of establishments. The survey 
instrument was developed by Roper Starch 
and includes questions pertaining to seating 
allocations, attitudes toward smoking laws, 
strategies to deal with smoking�nonsmoking 
customers, revenues, and projections of ef­
fects of smoking laws on revenues. 
IV. TESTING WHETHER SEATING
 
ALLOCATIONS ARE INFLUENCED BY
 
CUSTOMER PREFERENCES
 
Selected summary statistics demonstrate 
that ﬁrms in the sample differentiate them­
selves by a number of characteristics, includ­
ing chain afﬁliation, age, and size. The range 
of employment in bars and taverns is 0�158 
workers, and for restaurants it is 0�300 
workers.5 Firms also differentiate themselves 
on how they cater to smoking and nonsmok­
ing preferences of customers. Allocations 
range from strict prohibition, mixes of smok­
ing and nonsmoking seating, and smoking 
allowed throughout establishments. For 
restaurants, the average percentage of seat­
ing that is allocated to nonsmoking is 54%, 
while for bars and taverns it is 5%�this 
difference is consistent with expectations. 
Both types of establishments have cases 
where smoking is entirely prohibited, and 
both have cases where smoking is allowed 
throughout the establishment. Of owners� 
managers of restaurants who offer a non­
smoking seating section, more than two-
thirds indicate that this is a product of their 
own policy. For bars offering partial non­
smoking seating, more than half of man­
agers�owners indicate that this is a result of 
their own policy. The data indicate that both 
complete and partial nonsmoking environ­
ments exist in private markets with and with­
out smoking laws.6 
Table I displays means and standard devi­
ations associated with three variables: per­
cent of seating allocated to nonsmoking use, 
percent of smokers in the adult population, 
and the percent change in the adult smoker 
population over 1989�95, and for three sam­
5. Zero workers means that the ﬁrm is entirely run 
by the owner and�or family. 
6. The data are limited in that they test the knowl­
edge of owners about the source of the smoking law. 
There were many local smoking restrictions in place 
during the period when the survey was conducted; how­
ever, most of the more restrictive laws were put in place 
after 1996. 
ples: all states, states with a smoking law, 
and states without a smoking law. While the 
average nonsmoking seating allocation from 
states with and without a smoking law does 
not differ signiﬁcantly, signiﬁcant differences 
exist for the other two variables Žsigniﬁcance 
at 5% level .. That is, states with smoking 
laws tend to have fewer smokers and tend 
to have much larger reductions in smoking 
populations. 
Figure 1 displays distributions of the 
shares of seats devoted to nonsmoking in the 
states with and without smoking laws. For 
instance, 57% of ﬁrms in the states without 
smoking laws devote 0%�20% of their seat­
ing to nonsmoking use, as opposed to 62% of 
ﬁrms in states with smoking laws. Within this 
grouping, 52% of ﬁrms in states without 
smoking laws actually devote 0% of their 
seating to nonsmoking use, and 59% of ﬁrms 
in states with smoking laws devote 0% of 
their seating to nonsmoking use. At the other 
extreme, 16% of ﬁrms in states without laws 
devote 81%�100%, as opposed to 18% of 
ﬁrms in states with laws. Within this group­
ing, 14% of ﬁrms in states without smoking 
laws actually devote 100% of their seating to 
nonsmoking use, and 16% of ﬁrms in states 
with smoking laws devote 100% of their seat­
ing to nonsmoking use. Assuming that the 
distribution surrounding ﬁrms in no-law 
states is the expected distribution, the chi-
square test indicates at the 5% level that we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the distri­
bution surrounding ﬁrms in smoking law 
states does not differ signiﬁcantly from that 
of ﬁrms in no-law states. Therefore, the dis­
tribution of the shares of nonsmoking seat­
ing does not appear to differ between these 
two samples. It is important to note that this 
TABLE I 
Means and Standard Deviations 
All States States with Smoking Laws States without Smoking Laws 
( )n � 1300 ( )n � 968 ( )n � 332 
Nonsmoking seating
Ž% of total seating. 
29.5 
Ž39.5. 
29.1 
Ž39.9. 
30.6 
Ž38.3. 
Smokers 21.6 20.8 23.8 
Ž% of population. Ž3.2. Ž3.2. Ž2.0. 
Smoker change
Ž .% change, 1989�95 
�2.1 
Ž2.4. 
�2.9 
Ž2.2. 
�.003 
Ž1.6. 
Note: Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses below the means. 
FIGURE 1
 
data set was developed in 1996 and may not 
reﬂect the implications of de facto complete 
smoking bans such as the one that now exists 
in California. 
Many other factors may also inﬂuence 
allocations of seating into smoking�non­
Žsmoking designations. The size of a ﬁrm e.g., 
number of employees. may inﬂuence deci­
sions when scale economies exist in catering 
to both smoking and nonsmoking popula­
tions. A positive relationship between ﬁrm 
size and nonsmoking seating allocations may 
occur if larger ﬁrms may more easily sepa­
rate smokers from nonsmokers. Whether an 
establishment is a member of a corporate 
chain or an independent ﬁrm may also affect 
the allocation decision. Chain members may 
offer greater accommodation as an element 
in their overall corporate strategy. If this is 
the case, then chain members would offer 
greater nonsmoking seating allocations than 
independents. Years in business may also 
inﬂuence seating allocations, since estab­
lished reputations may attract a different mix 
of customers, and there may be differential 
accommodation costs related to age of build­
ings. It is possible that older businesses may 
tend to accommodate less, given that their 
owners tend to cater to more established and 
stable customer bases than newer businesses. 
Table II displays estimates from three re­
gression equations.7 Column 1 contains esti­
mates of an ordinary least squares regression 
of nonsmoking seating on smoking laws. 
Ž . NSi � f Smoklawi . ,1 Ž 
where NSi � percentage of seating that is 
nonsmoking 
Smoklawi � 1 if smoking law present; 
� 0 otherwise. 
No signiﬁcant relation is determined by this 
simple regression, thus indicating that smok­
ing laws do not appear to inﬂuence seating 
allocations of owners. 
In column 2 of Table II, we instrument 
for smoking laws with tobacco manufactur­
ing in the state because there are various 
factors relating to the social acceptability of 
7. Signiﬁcant relations are assumed to be those 
meeting statistical signiﬁcance at 5% Žtwo-tailed. levels 
or greater. 
TABLE II 
Ordinary-Least-Squares Results 
% Nonsmoking % Nonsmoking 
Dependent Variable seating Smoking Law Seating 
Constant a30.57 0.76* a111.14 
Ž14.10. Ž62.75. Ž9.09. 
Smoking law 
ŽYes � 1, No � 0. 
�1.47 
Ž�0.58. 
Tobacco manufacturing �.0001* 
Ž�6.86. 
Smoking law instrument �3.17 
Ž�0.31. 
Smokers a�2.17 
Ž�7.96. 
% change in smokers 0.26 
Ž0.57. 
Chain member a5.68 
ŽYes � 1, No � 0. Ž3.08. 
Years in business �0.09 
Ž�1.83. 
Number of employees a0.26 
Ž6.60. 
Bar a�45.14 
ŽYes � 1, No � 0. Ž�25.89. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.00 0.03 0.45 
Mean dependent variable 29.48 0.74 29.48 
F-statistic 0.34 47.02 155.95 
Observations 1,300 1,300 1,300 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
 
aSigniﬁcance at 1% level.
 
smoking that may inﬂuence the smoking law 
variable that are hypothesized to separately 
inﬂuence seating allocations as well. The 
presence of a tobacco manufacturing facility 
in a state serves as a good proxy for these 
factors, since these facilities tend to be con­
centrated in states where tobacco growing 
and employment make up a large part of the 
economy. States with a larger percentage of 
people involved in the tobacco industry may 
be less likely to pass severe restrictions on 
tobacco use in general. Equation Ž . is esti­2 
mated by ordinary least squares: 
Ž .  Ž .2 Smoklawi � f Tobmani , 
where Tobmani � dollar value of state to­
bacco manufacturing in 1994 Ž$M .. The to­
bacco-manufacturing variable, which exerts a 
statistically signiﬁcant and negative inﬂuence 
on the smoking law variable, indicates that 
states with sizeable tobacco manufacturing 
will tend to not pass smoking laws. 
Ordinary-least-squares estimation of 
equation Ž . tests the hypothesis that private 3 
markets allocate nonsmoking seating subject 
to the following variables: smoking law Žin­
.strument , incidence of smoking in the adult 
population, changes in smoking incidence, 
whether the ﬁrm is part of a corporate chain 
or independent, ﬁrm size, years in business, 
and whether the ﬁrm is a restaurant or a bar 
or tavern.8 
Ž .3 ŽNS � f Smoklaw , S95 , S9589 , i i i i 
Chaini , Yearsi , Sizei , Bari . , 
8. Variables obtained outside of the survey are: 
smoking law is obtained from the Tobacco Institute’s 
‘‘State Smoking Restriction Laws’’ �unpublished data ;� 
all other data obtained from the Center for Disease 
Control. The smoking rate data measure the prevalence 
of current cigarette smoking among adults, and are 
generated by the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System. The tobacco manufacturing variable measures 
cash receipts from tobacco large enough to be sepa­
rately reported by the Center for Disease Control. 
� � � � 
where S95i is the percentage of adult popu­
lation that smokes, S9589i is the change in 
percentage of adult population that smokes 
from 1989 to 1995, Chaini is 1 if ﬁrm is part 
of corporate chain;� 0 otherwise Sizei is the 
number of full- and part-time employees, 
Yearsi is the number of years in business, 
Bari is 1 if bar or tavern;� 0 if restaurant. 
Equation Ž .3 assumes that smoking laws 
do not directly inﬂuence smoking behavior in 
a way that would separately inﬂuence the 
owners’ allocation of nonsmoking seating. A 
counter-hypothesis�that state smoking laws 
themselves may cause fewer citizens to 
smoke�implies a simultaneous equations 
bias in our estimation. However, while the 
intent of some smoking laws is to decrease 
smoking, the primary intent is to control 
smoking, and especially exposure to second­
hand smoke, within restaurants, bars and 
taverns.9 While many advocates of smoking 
laws might also prefer that smoking decline 
outside of these establishments as well, this is 
clearly of secondary importance for these 
particular types of restrictions. Moreover, we 
are unable to test whether smoking laws lead 
to less smoking by customers Žand therefore 
leads owners to allocate less seating to smok­
ers. simply because this requires time-series 
data that is unavailable. Such data may be­
come available in the future, but at this 
point we know of no other data that mea­
sures seating allocations and none that pro­
vides such a series over time. 
It is also unclear that smoking laws would 
signiﬁcantly affect smoking behavior because 
of less-than-perfect enforcement. Anecdotal 
evidence appears to suggest that those busi­
nesses that would be most adversely affected 
by smoking laws Ži.e., those catering to rela­
tively high numbers of smokers. would also 
prefer relaxed enforcement of smoking 
9. Sciaca and Ratliff �1998 , writing in the � American 
Journal of Health Promotion, mention reduction in expo­
sure of nonsmokers to ETS Ženvironmental tobacco 
smoke. ﬁrst in the reasons for why laws prohibiting 
smoking in restaurants are approved. They also suggest 
that these laws provide an additional incentive and a 
supportive environment for smokers to quit, but this 
reasoning appears secondary in importance. Moreover, 
California approved a total smoking ban in all restau­
rants and bars based on protection of employees from 
ETS, once again indicating that any effects on smoking 
behavior outside of these establishments to be sec­
ondary. 
laws.10 To the extent that this is true, smok­
ing laws may not be particularly effective in 
lowering smoking�both within and outside 
restaurants, bars and taverns�and in this 
case may not be particularly effective in 
changing owners’ allocation of nonsmoking 
seating.11 
Estimation results of equation Ž .3 are pre­
sented in the third column of Table II.12 The 
smoking law instrument does not exert a 
signiﬁcant effect on seating allocations. The 
incidence of smoking in the adult popula­
tion, however, exerts a negative and statisti­
cally signiﬁcant effect on nonsmoking seat­
ing. That is, ﬁrms allocate less seating to 
nonsmoking use as the percentage of smok­
ers rise in the population�a relationship 
consistent with expectations. Change in the 
nonsmoking population exerts no statistically 
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on seating allocations. 
As hypothesized, afﬁliations with a chain and 
ﬁrm size are signiﬁcantly and positively re­
lated to the percentage of nonsmoking seat­
ing. As hypothesized, years in business exert 
a negative effect on nonsmoking seating but 
is only signiﬁcant at the 10% percent level. 
Finally, the dummy variable for bars and 
taverns exerts a signiﬁcant and negative in­
ﬂuence on seating allocations, as consistent 
with expectations. 
That smoking laws are not signiﬁcant de­
terminants of nonsmoking seating deserves 
further discussion. The data for this analysis 
were developed in 1996, prior to the estab­
lishment of many highly restrictive local 
smoking ordinances. In the case where smok­
ing is banned Žand enforced. throughout es­
tablishments�or is limited so that it be­
comes extremely inconvenient to smoke�the 
results of the analysis will not apply. How­
ever, when smoking laws allow for the ac­
commodation of both smokers and nonsmok­
10. Newspaper articles on the smoking ban in Cali­
fornia, for example, document widespread civil disobedi­
ence; see, Blankstein 1998 , Canto 1998 , and Risling 
�1998 .� 
11. Chaloupka and Saffer �1992� ﬁnd no evidence 
that state-wide smoking bans in restaurants have any 
effect on smoking as measured by cigarette consump­
tion. 
12. We included cross-effects between numbers of 
employees and smoking law variables and between 
smoking law and bar variables, but neither exerted 
statistically signiﬁcant effects. In addition, while it would 
be appropriate to control for intrastate correlation in 
our regressions, this is not possible given the small 
number of observations of many states. 
ers, states with relatively high percentages of 
nonsmokers also tend to have relatively high 
allocations of space devoted to nonsmoking 
uses. This suggests that, in many cases, 
smoking laws are enacted ‘‘after the fact’’ in 
the sense that they appear after the private 
market has already reallocated resources in 
proﬁt-maximizing ways. That is, ﬁrms ﬁnd it 
proﬁtable to allocate more space to non­
smokers, as these customers become more 
important to their overall revenues. A smok­
ing law will not alter allocation of space 
when ﬁrms themselves have already met 
smoking preferences of customers, provided 
that the laws do not mandate that nonsmok­
ing space signiﬁcantly exceed that provided 
voluntarily by owners. Of course, another 
interpretation may be that restrictive laws 
are simply not highly enforced and are there­
fore ineffective in altering nonsmoking space 
within restaurants, bars or taverns.13 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Proponents of laws restricting smoking 
within restaurants, bars, and taverns argue 
that they are necessary based on the belief 
that owners will underallocate nonsmoking 
seating in their establishments. This article 
provides the following insights into this issue. 
First, in the absence of outright smoking 
bans, ﬁrms allocate greater shares of seating 
to nonsmoking use when their customers ex­
hibit stronger preferences for such seating. 
In other words, the private market allocates 
air space resources within ﬁrms with or with­
out smoking restrictions, and it is unlikely 
that removal of smoking laws would overturn 
this result. In fact, there is no evidence that 
smoking laws themselves affect the seating 
allocation decisions, thus indicating that pri­
vate markets have already dealt effectively 
with the smoking issue in the sense that, in 
the absense of outright smoking bans, ﬁrms 
tend to voluntarily allocate in excess of gov­
ernment mandates or that enforcement of 
smoking laws is imperfect. 
13. In this event, however, it would appear that if 
these laws were enforced, they would tend to lower 
proﬁts of some owners. 
Second, the article suggests that the con­
tinued decline of smokers as a share of the 
population will encourage the owners of hos­
pitality establishments to allocate more space 
to nonsmoking customers. This reallocation 
arises because of the proﬁt motive and ap­
pears to be an active process within the 
restaurant, bar, and tavern industries. Eco­
nomic examination of the timing of these 
decisions�how quickly do owners reallocate 
their seating space to changes in numbers of 
nonsmokers�would be a useful addition to 
our research. At this point, however, time-
series data are unavailable that would allow 
us to examine the speed of seating realloca­
tions by owners toward nonsmokers. 
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